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The Iranian Oil Bourse
 A Threat to Dollar Supremacy?
Robert Looney
Contrary to the writings of many political analysts, 
there are many fronts on which to battle the United 
States. Iran has considered opening another front by 
leading an assault on the U.S. dollar. Will it succeed? 
Our writer thinks it will not, partly because, as of 
now, the dollar’s sources of strength are considerable. 
But he realizes that the dollar could come under more 
serious pressure in coming years.
Contemporary warfare has traditionally involved underlying conflicts 
regarding economics and resources. Today these intertwined conflicts also 
involve international currencies and thus are increasingly complex.1
Iran’s nuclear projects, alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), or 
its supposed support of “terrorist <<no end of quote>> organizations, as 
the Bush administration claims, do not pose a threat to Washington. What 
does pose a threat is Iran’s attempt to reshape the global economical system 
by converting it from a petrodollar system to a petro-euro system.2
It is enough to make the Great Satan–loathing visionaries behind the Ira-
nian regime salivate.3
If, as is widely believed, the tales of the 1001 Arabian Nights came out of 
Persia, then Iran, Persia’s modern successor, has given the world yet another 
great fantasy: the Iranian oil bourse.4
Looney
2 Challenge/March–April 2007
SINCE THE UNITED STATES EMERGED AS THE DOMINANT GLOBAL SUPERPOWER AT the end of World War II, U.S. hegemony has rested on three un-assailable but somewhat interconnected pillars: (1) overwhelm-
ing U.S. military superiority over all its rivals, (2) the superiority of 
American production methods, and (3) the relative strength of the 
U.S. dollar as the global reserve currency. However, outside the mostly 
arcane academic discussions the role of the dollar has received surpris-
ingly little attention, given that the dollar’s continued international 
role is the most vulnerable pillar, and its ability to support the other 
two pillars is increasingly questioned. In this light, Iran’s decision to 
open a euro-denominated Iranian oil bourse (IOB) is seen by many as 
an aggressive attack on the weakest link in America’s global security 
system:
Iran does not pose a threat to the United States because of its nuclear 
projects, its WMD, or its support of “terrorist organizations,” as the 
American administration is claiming, but in its attempt to reshape the 
global economic system by converting it from a petrodollar to a petro-
euro system. <<This quote is almost the same language as the second 
paragraph, which must be a paraphrase, and each has a different 
citation.>> Such conversion is looked upon as a flagrant declaration 
of economic war against the US that would flatten the revenues of 
the American corporations and eventually might cause an economic 
collapse.5
Proponents of the IOB contend that the bourse will enable petro-
dollar currency hedging, thus fundamentally altering the dynamics 
of oil and gas trades around the world. If the IOB succeeds, the U.S. 
will no longer be able to effortlessly expand credit using U.S. Treasury 
bills, and the dollar’s demand/liquidity value will fall.
The tacit assumption underlying Iran’s pending attack on the dollar 
is that the dollar’s role in oil markets absolves the United States from 
the harsh economic laws governing activity in other countries—that the 
role of the dollar is ultimately responsible for much of the economic, 
military, and political strength of the United States.
In fact, many Web sites (for example, www.pressurepoint.org/pp_
its_the_oil.html) are currently peddling the theory that the United 
States invaded Iraq because in 2000 Saddam Hussein had switched 
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from dollars to the euro as the medium of exchange for purchasing 
Iraqi oil—that the invasion was largely undertaken to discourage the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and other 
oil-exporting countries from following suit. While many of these sites 
vary in detail, the logic of their arguments is broadly similar:6
1. The United States has a great economic interest in maintaining 
the existing dollar based system—petrodollars eventually end 
up in the hands of foreign companies and governments, which 
in turn look for a safe place to invest them.
2. There is a natural inclination to shift the dollars back to the 
United States, thereby avoiding any currency risk.
3. Back in the United States, the dollars flow into assets such as U.S. 
bonds, keeping interest rates low, or into equities, thus creating 
stock market appreciation.
4. In both cases, the United States benefits from greater availability 
of investment capital, which is subsequently used to fuel growth 
in a noninflationary environment.
5. The great demand for the dollar (aided by the fact that oil is paid 
for in dollars) helps maintain its strength in international cur-
rency markets despite the rapid outflow from the United States 
driven by massive current account deficits.
6. Most important, the strong dollar lessens the real costs borne 
by the United States in Iraq. Specifically, because countries have 
to hold large amounts of dollars as reserves to pay for their oil, 
the United States can in effect exchange the paper it prints for 
real goods and services many of which ultimately wind up in 
places like Iraq or Afghanistan. The same arguments were made 
by the French during the time of the Vietnam war.
In sum, proponents of the IOB contend that the dollar-priced oil 
system creates a virtuous cycle for the United States, making the coun-
try’s massive trade deficit tolerable and its foreign military operations 
financially bearable. In effect, the existing dollar/oil system allows 
the U.S. government to run up a massive deficit without rising <<OK? 
Not raising?>> interest rates as foreign dollars are used to purchase 
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U.S. government debt. The economy thrives because the U.S. private 
sector is not crowded out of the financial markets through normally 
rising interest rates. The net result is to allow strong levels of consump-
tion and investment despite the country’s extraordinary low rates of 
saving. The net result: the United States can pursue overseas military 
operations without being encumbered by the resource constraints 
facing all other countries—the United States can have both guns and 
butter. It follows that breaking the dollar/oil link would drastically 
reduce the role of the U.S. dollar as an international reserve currency, 
and thus also reduce the country’s military/economic power.
The mechanisms of the dollar’s demise as a result of severing its link 
with oil are often assumed by oil bourse proponents to be relatively 
straightforward: Because a certain portion of existing dollar reserves 
will not be needed to pay for oil, other currencies like the euro will 
be used for this purpose, thus becoming more attractive. The dollar 
will begin to fall in value, causing many holders to switch to other 
currencies in anticipation of further declines. With rising import 
prices, caused by the dollar devaluation, and increased inflation in 
the United States, the Federal Reserve will tighten the money supply, 
slowing down economic activity and investment. With the decline 
in economic growth, other holders of the currency will doubt the 
country’s medium-term prospects and its ability to service its massive 
external debts. Investor panic will precipitate a collapse of the dollar 
and, ultimately, the U.S. economy.
While one may take issue with the above scenario or some of its 
main assumptions, the fact remains that there is rising speculation in 
the mainstream financial press that the dollar’s reign is in slow decline. 
This speculation coincides with increases in the U.S. balance-of-pay-
ments deficits, currently at an all-time high of nearly 7 percent of the 
gross domestic product (GDP). The presumption is that the United 
States is living way beyond its means and that a day of reckoning is 
nearing. In fact, during the past thirty years, the dollar has had four 
bouts of market depreciation. At one point, during the most recent 
one, which began in 2002, it fell by 28 percent against the euro and 
by 14 percent against a broad basket of currencies.7 Clearly there is 
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concern that the dollar may be increasingly vulnerable to shifts into 
other currencies, and, with that, its role as a reserve currency in jeop-
ardy. In this case the IOB would simply accelerate the abandonment 
of the dollar.
Summing up, Iran’s plan of attack is not without economic logic. 
Proponents of the IOB recognize that the heavy use of the dollar in 
international trade sustains its foreign exchange value by inducing 
people to hold greater dollar balances than they otherwise would. The 
dollar’s ensuing strength encourages its use in other transactions, 
which requires still greater dollar holdings in a dollar-augmenting 
cycle enabling the United States to have more of both guns and butter 
at little or no extra cost.
Is there a good chance the proposed Iranian euro-denominated oil 
bourse might be the catalyst that sets off a mass flight from the dol-
lar? If so, what additional follow-on factors might contribute to the 
dollar’s demise? Or, conversely, are there good reasons to discount 
the IOB’s ability to influence international dollar holdings and thus 
its value in the major foreign exchange markets? If so, what factors 
might counter the IOB-based scenario outlined above? Can certain 
U.S. actions enhance these forces?
Creation of an Iranian Euro-Denominated Oil Bourse
The proposal to set up the Iranian oil bourse first appeared in Iran’s 
Third Development Plan (2000–2005). Initially, the intention was to 
make the IOB operational by March 20, 2006, with the bourse located 
not in Tehran but on distant Kish Island. Officially, the purpose of 
the IOB was to make Iran the main hub for oil contracts in the Gulf 
region.
Clearly, Iran has some inherent advantages over other potential 
sites: The country is the world’s fourth-largest producer of oil and is 
in close proximity to Europe and two of the most rapidly growing 
markets, India and China.8 Furthermore, the IOB has the potential to 
provide Iran with concrete economic benefits. Invoicing oil in euros 
would be logical for Iran, as trade with the euro zone countries ac-
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counts for 45 percent of its total trade. More than a third of Iran’s 
oil exports are destined for Europe, while oil exports to the United 
States are nonexistent.9
Having overcome the major obstacle (lack of a benchmark oil de-
nominated in euros) to the adoption of euro-pricing in the oil markets, 
is the IOB likely to result in a significant shift out of dollars, thus 
perhaps precipitating that currency’s fall in value and eventually its 
use as an international reserve currency? Here at least three consider-
ations appear critical: (1) What domestic factors are likely to constrain 
development of the IOB, and how great an effect will they have on 
establishing the bourse in Iran? (2) Assuming the IOB is established 
and operational, is the likely shift into euros for oil trading purposes 
account for a significant share of international reserves? (3) Are there 
any offsetting factors likely to be at work to cause countries to hold a 
large share of their reserves in dollars, irrespective of progress made 
by the IOB?
Domestic Constraints on IOB Development
First, there is the question of how much crude an Iranian oil bourse 
could handle. Iran is the world’s fourth-largest producer of crude, 
pumping only about 5 percent of the world total, and is unlikely to 
add much to that. The Iranian fields are mature, and over the next 
decade, production will probably begin to decline, especially if the 
U.S. sanctions continue. Other countries that are likely to trade on 
the IOB probably would include Venezuela, the world’s tenth-largest 
producer—no other countries have shown interest in participating in 
the new oil bourse. 
Clearly, many factors specific to Iran continue to limit the attrac-
tiveness of the country as a location for an international oil market. 
These relate mainly to the country’s relative underdevelopment across 
a whole spectrum of economic, governance, and social dimensions, 
each of which casts some doubt on the country’s ability to develop 
a competitive alternative to the existing oil markets.
The extent of Iran’s relative underdevelopment and the daunting 
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magnitude of its competitive disadvantage are probably best revealed 
in a number of key indices that look at: globalization, governance, 
economic freedom, access to capital, and indicators of failed states.
Limited Integration into the International System
Globalization is a multifaceted phenomenon with no one factor fully 
capturing its impact on national economies. The Foreign Policy glo-
balization index10 looks at several indicators spanning trade, finance, 
political engagement, information technology, and personal contact 
to determine the rankings of sixty-two countries that account for 96 
percent of the world’s gross domestic product and 85 percent of the 
world’s population. The index measures twelve variables, which are 
divided into four “brackets”: economic integration, technological 
connectivity, personal contact, and political engagement.
All indices of this type are inherently arbitrary. Still, the fact that 
Iran ranks last in the 2005 index (out of 62 countries) suggests a major 
policy failure. When viewed by subcategory, an interesting picture 
emerges: Iran ranks 51st in the economic area, 62d in the personal 
dimension, 48th technologically, and 61st in political engagement. 
Iran’s external progress appears greater in the economic arena than 
political ones, with the Islamic republic ranking 47th in trade open-
ness and 48th in foreign direct investment. Still, Iran is a relatively 
isolated country that has forgone many of the distinct benefits derived 
from integration into the global economy, a conclusion reinforced by 
the country’s technological connectivity rankings, where it is 42d, 
57th, and 61st, respectively, with regard to Internet users, Internet 
hosts, and secure servers.
Deficient Governance Structures
While the ranking of countries’ progress toward improved governance 
is inherently subjective, a recent World Bank study11 provides a set of 
rankings based on a set of estimates of six dimensions of governance 
covering 199 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002. 
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The dimensions measured include: voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regula-
tory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption.
On the whole, Iran lags considerably behind other countries in most 
areas of governance. In fact, the country is not above the mean in any 
category. While, relative to the base year of 1996, some progress has 
been made in regulatory quality, rule of law, and corruption, there 
has been a decline in the areas of voice and accountability, political 
stability, and government effectiveness. The extremely low levels of 
regulatory quality and the rule of law represent major obstacles to 
the development of an international oil bourse.
Little Progress Toward Economic Freedom
The protection of an individual’s rightfully acquired property and 
his ability to exchange that property with others is the cornerstone 
of economic freedom. According to this definition, the Index of 
Economic Freedom compiled by the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street 
Journal12 classifies Iran as repressed, with Iran scoring 148th out of 
161 countries in 2005. With zero indicating the highest level of eco-
nomic freedom and 5 indicating the lowest, Iran receives the lowest 
score in four key areas:
Government Intervention in the Economy. The country’s low ranking 
was based on a high concentration of inefficient state-owned enterpris-
es, combined with politically powerful individuals and institutions, 
such as the Islamic charities, whose tight grip on the non-oil economy 
through preferential access to domestic credit, foreign exchange, 
licenses, and public contracts crowds out the private sector.
Regulation. Despite recent attempts at reform, rules controlling busi-
ness practices are poorly enacted and implemented in Iran, effectively 
discouraging the establishment of new businesses. Contract negotia-
tions are often lengthy, prolonged by exhaustive details demanded by 
state agencies and the slowly functioning bureaucracy, and contracts 
require approval from an extensive number of higher officials before 
they can be concluded.
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Banking and Finance. Because Islamic law restricts the ability of 
banks to charge interest, this sector is dominated by state-owned 
banks. The bulk of commercial banks’ loan portfolios are taken up 
with low-return loans to state agencies and parastatals.
Property Rights. Property rights are not protected in Iran. Recourse 
to the courts is costly, unwieldy, and often counterproductive, and 
rarely leads to the swift resolution of outstanding disputes. Few for-
eign firms have had satisfactory experiences when seeking to bring a 
contract dispute before a court.
Capital Market Development
There is a reason the world’s two major oil markets are located in the 
world’s major financial centers, New York and London. Supporting 
financial structures greatly assist oil traders’ ability to quickly raise 
and place the vast sums of money flowing through the markets each 
day. While the Heritage/Wall Street Journal index suggests that Iran 
has made some progress in capital market development, the greater 
level of detailed provided by the Milken Institute Capital Access Index 
(CAI)13 allows for a more comprehensive assessment.
The CAI measures not only the breadth, depth, and vitality of capital 
markets, but also the ability to gain access without discrimination. 
The index is made up of seven factors affecting a country’s financial 
markets: macroeconomic environment, institutional environment, 
financial and banking institutions, equity market development, bond 
market development, alternative sources of capital, and international 
access. By this index, Iran again rates low. Out of a total sample of 121 
countries, Iran ranked 93d in 2003, with its rank increasing to 69th 
in 2004 before falling back to 79th (behind Mongolia and Uganda) 
in 2005.
Insight into the causes of Iran’s low capital access ranking can be 
gained from examining its scores on some of the index’s individual 
factors. For example, ranking below the Central African Republic and 
Honduras at 93d in 2005, Iran scored extremely low in the extent to 
which its macroeconomic environment is favorable to the running 
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and financing of a business. It came in at 87th, again just behind 
the Central African Republic, in the level of involvement of deposit-
taking financial and banking institutions in business financing. Fi-
nally, the Islamic republic is nearly devoid of alternative sources of 
capital—venture capital, private placement and credit cards—ranking 
104th behind Burundi and Guinea. Needless to say, the country’s 
international access to capital was also extremely low, ranking 98th 
behind Angola and Armenia.
Aspects of a Failed State
Iran is increasingly appearing on lists of “failed states.” By defini-
tion, a failed state suggests a massive breakdown of policies, many of 
which were presumably avoidable. Obviously, a government that has 
lost control of its territory or of the monopoly on the legitimate use 
of force qualifies as a failed state. However, there can be more subtle 
attributes of failure, such as lacking the authority to make collective 
decisions, the capacity to deliver public services or collect taxes, or 
the power to curb large-scale civil disobedience.
The Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy created a global ranking of 
weak and failed states.14 Using twelve social, economic, political, and 
military indicators, they ranked sixty states in order of their vulner-
ability to violent internal conflict, with 1 being the worst and 60 the 
best. Iran faired considerably better than in the case of globalization, 
ranking 57th.
Scores on the index’s individual components range from 1 to 10, 
with 10 being the worst. Iran’s individual scores were as follows: (1) 
Demographic Pressures [5.0]; (2) Refugees and Displaced Persons 
[8.0]; (3) Group Grievance [7.3]; (4) Human Flight [6.0]; (5) Uneven 
Development [9.0]; (6) Economic Decline [6.7]; (7) Delegitimization 
of State [8.1]; (8) Public Services [7.0]; (9) Human Rights [7.9]; (10) 
Security Apparatus [6.0]; (11) Factionalized Elites [8.3]; and (12) Ex-
ternal Intervention [6.0].
Among the twelve indicators, Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace 
argue that two are critical indicators of a failing state. They claim 
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that uneven development, which indicates inequality within states, 
and not poverty, is extremely instrumental in increasing instability, 
as is the criminalization or delegitimization of the state that occurs 
when state institutions are regarded as corrupt, illegal, or ineffective. 
Notably, Iran scores very high in both these categories.
Clearly there are many similar and related indices measuring prog-
ress along different dimensions. Unfortunately for Iran, they all paint 
pretty much the same picture of a country that has been left behind by 
the worldwide economic and political reform movements that began 
in the 1980s, with the so-called Washington Consensus stressing ef-
ficiency, economic stability, and integration into the world economy. 
The implications for Iran’s proposed oil bourse are clear:15
1. Tehran’s exchange is simply not attractive compared with the 
exchanges in London and New York, where dealers and traders are 
prospering amid their well-developed networks. On distant Kish 
Island, they would (a) lack trained locals to work in their opera-
tions, (b) have to deal with a notoriously corrupt bureaucracy, 
(c) lose contact with an efficiently regulated transparent finan-
cial system, (d) lack the necessary technological infrastructure, 
and (e) sever most links to the globe’s electronic commercial 
structures on which trading relies.
2. Because Iran is not even a member of the World Trade Orga-
nization, dealers who move to Kish Island would also miss the 
kind of legal structures on which they rely to facilitate trade and 
secure the contracts that support it. Furthermore, a firm’s move 
to Kish would subject any staff assigned there to Sharia law. 
Western oil company employees tolerate that burden because 
they must go where the oil is. The same is not true of futures 
trades. <<traders?>>
3. Iran’s proposed bourse would also face serious diplomatic and 
religious problems. To work the exchange would require a free 
flow of funds and oil, but Iran’s membership in OPEC subjects 
it to strict production and sales quotas.16 It is not at all clear how 
Tehran plans to reconcile one requirement with the other. Most 
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fundamental of all, at least for many Iranians is the likely viola-
tion of Islamic law. The Koran forbids either paying or receiving 
interest; futures contracts always carry an implicit interest for 
the time value of money. On this basis, the bourse could pose 
more of a problem for relations between Iran’s government and 
its people than for the dollar.
Against this long list of impediments, it is difficult to see how such 
an oil exchange could even get started—modern, cosmopolitan Dubai 
with vastly superior governance and progress at economic reform is 
struggling to find a significant niche for its oil exchange. Further-
more, the Iranian government is unconvincing in its argument that 
proximity to the Middle East oil fields can overcome other reserva-
tions, especially in today’s electronic age. Neither can Iran use its oil 
production, as it hinted, to force traders and dealers to its exchange. 
As long as Iran sells its oil onto world markets, it has no control over 
where it gets traded.
In sum, Iran has a number of gaping governance and institutional 
deficiencies that will severely limit the growth and prosperity of a 
new oil bourse. Perhaps over time, with the correct mix of economic 
reforms and institutional development, the country could attract a 
reasonable number of traders and take some business away from the 
two incumbent dollar-based exchanges. If this occurs, are there further 
obstacles to dethroning the dollar? At issue are the workings of the 
international system and Iran’s ability to decrease the attractiveness 
of the dollar within that system.
Workings of the International System
In terms of external developments, the expected value of the dollar 
would appear to be the key factor affecting the currency that other 
producers would want to denominate their oil sales. From the perspec-
tive of the oil producers, some simple rules apply:17
1. At one level, the currency in which you price your products is 
largely a matter of bookkeeping. The Saudis can price their oil 
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in dollars, or the South Africans in their gold, or the French in 
the new Airbus SAS aircraft, without its making much difference 
to their actual income. As soon as the dollars come in, they can 
sell them for whatever currency they want. If you are uncertain 
about the future price that your product is likely to command, 
then you can buy and sell currencies in the futures markets. 
Just because you price a product in that currency, you are not 
compelled to hold that currency.
2. In the medium term, it does matter. The producers of any product 
are looking for high stable prices. If your product is priced in a 
permanently weak currency, then you have to keep raising the 
price. That is far from satisfactory. At some point the temptation 
to switch to a stronger currency will become irresistible.
3. Much depends on the future path of the dollar. [As of February 
2005] it has been weak for about three years now. <<update? 
this is two years later. Also, some of references are 2006, so 
some of article at least was written updated to then>> So far, 
producers have responded with higher prices. Two more years 
of dollar weaknesses <<have we had those?>> and they may well 
decide to take more radical action.
The key question is whether the dollar will be able to maintain suf-
ficient value to discourage oil producers from switching to another 
pricing currency. If not, how far would the dollar have to fall before 
producers would want to switch to another currency such as the 
euro? A related issue is the extent to which crude-oil importers will 
want to pay in euros rather than dollars. Although, as noted earlier, 
the use of the dollar as the international system’s fiat currency has 
been declining for about thirty years, some 70 percent of interna-
tional currency reserves that finance international trade are still in 
U.S. dollars. Japan and China alone have built up nearly $2 trillion 
in U.S. Treasury bonds and other low-interest-earning dollar assets. 
Will these and other major countries be content to continue holding 
a large percentage of dollar reserves irrespective of developments in 
the Iranian oil bourse?
As implied above, the answer to these questions will most likely 
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depend on the view one has concerning the causes and sustainability 
of the United States’ balance-of-payments deficit on current account. 
Surprisingly, despite the importance of the international financial 
system and the volumes written on it, there is still a lack of general 
agreement amongst economists on the underlying determinants cur-
rently driving the U.S. current-account deficits.
In fact, currently there are three different views of the factors mainly 
responsible for the massive U.S. current-account deficits: (1) the trade 
view, in which trade flows are the primary factors and the offsetting 
capital inflows are secondary; (b) the gross domestic product view, in 
which the current-account deficit is perceived as a shortfall between 
domestic investment and domestic savings; and (c) the capital flows 
view, in which the trade and current account deficits are a result of 
the capital account surplus.
If the U.S. current account is viewed in the first sense—as a function 
of U.S. overspending/lack of competitiveness, then it is usually seen 
as unsustainable and thus crisis prone. A likely outcome would be a 
gradual decline in the value of the dollar or, even worse, a possible 
collapse of the dollar following an adverse shock to the system. In 
either case, dollar-dominated foreign exchange reserves are risky. A 
shift to euros would be more likely, and with it an increase in euro-
denominated oil sales.
Nearly all the scenarios linking the Iranian oil bourse to the demise 
of the dollar either implicitly or explicitly rely on this interpretation 
of the U.S. balance of payments. While this view seems to make the 
most intuitive sense, especially to noneconomists, it is biased toward 
the most pessimistic outcomes for the dollar.
The second view stressing savings and investment imbalances often 
sees long-run demographic patterns as supporting the dollar.18 Propo-
nents of this position contend that (1) the sustainability of the U.S. 
current-account deficit is a function of the rest of the world’s savings 
and investment pattern, and (2) the rest of the world’s savings behavior 
is significantly affected by their demographic trends. Asia, particularly 
China, is currently experiencing large percentages of its populations 
in the high-savings age groups. For many of these countries, savings 
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outstrip the number of profitable investment opportunities and, as 
a result, are placed in the broad and deep U.S. capital markets. In 
essence, this interpretation attributes the high U.S. current-account 
deficits to excessive external savings, rather than overspending in the 
United States. In this way, the resilience of the dollar in the face of a 
massive current-account deficit is due in large part to developments 
outside the United States.
On the other hand, if the U.S. current account is viewed in the third 
sense—as largely reflecting relative rates of return across countries 
with the United States seen as a more attractive investment destina-
tion—then the dollar’s ability to maintain its value is even less of a 
concern. This was essentially the view of Nobel laureate Milton Fried-
man, who contended that the U.S. current account was in deficit simply 
because foreigners wanted to invest in the United States.
This view was predicated on the idea that the capital account (vol-
untary inflows of capital) of the balance of payments determines 
the current account (largely goods and services). If this is the case, 
the financing and sustainability of the U.S. current-account deficits 
should not raise concerns about the future value of the dollar. The 
value of the dollar would not have to decline to assist in reducing the 
size of the deficit, nor would it fall in value stemming from investor 
concern over the ability of the United States to service its external 
debt. The share of dollar-denominated reserves might even continue 
to increase. There would be no special motivation to hold euros for 
the purpose of importing oil.
There is no reason why the second and third views cannot coexist 
simultaneously. Currently, many feel we are in a period of excess 
world savings (mainly East Asia and the Gulf oil states) and relatively 
high returns on U.S. assets. This explanation would easily account for 
the dollar’s strengthening since early 2005, despite growing deficits 
in the current account.
In sum, the second and third views are much more amenable to 
sustainable scenarios, with the likelihood of a dollar crisis or devalu-
ation much less likely. These views stress that the United States is in 
an exceptionally advantageous situation because it does not need to 
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borrow in a conventional sense. Part of the financing of the U.S. cur-
rent-account deficit comes voluntarily because of the attractiveness 
of the United States as an investment destination, providing generally 
higher rates of return than obtainable elsewhere—because of the size, 
scope, openness, and liquidity of the U.S. capital markets, and because 
of the dollar’s role as the world’s prime investment, transaction, and 
reserve currency.
Interest rates are determined by the conditions in the U.S. money 
and capital market rather than dictated by the lenders. And, unlike 
most other countries, the United States has the ability to finance its 
external deficits in its own currency. There is no doubt that this rela-
tive easiness in financing is an important factor in sustaining the U.S. 
trade and current-account deficits.
Which of the three interpretations of the U.S. balance of payments 
is more likely to be correct? Clearly, no definitive answer is possible—
there is no doubt some truth in all three interpretations. However, 
one can gain a sense as to their relative explanatory power by delv-
ing a bit deeper into how the workings of the current world system 
may affect the attractiveness of the dollar as a reserve currency; in 
particular, the willingness of central banks to link domestic curren-
cies, either loosely or tightly, to the dollar—the, <<some missing or 
wrong here>> existence, pervasiveness, and longevity of the so-called 
Bretton Woods II system.19
Bretton Woods II is not an official system. It is simply a construct 
many economists use to describe what they consider to be the de 
facto manner in which countries are currently managing their ex-
change rates and balance-of-payments positions. Under the original 
post–World War II Bretton Woods system, the dollar was officially 
linked to gold, with other countries committed to maintaining par 
values of their currencies with the dollar. That system was inherently 
unstable and collapsed in the early 1970s under the stresses brought 
on by irresolvable current-account imbalances between the deficit 
countries (mainly the United States) and surplus countries (mainly 
Germany and Japan).
Under the current informal system, with no official exchange-rate 
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commitments, proponents of the Bretton Woods II interpretation 
view the large U.S. balance-of-payments deficits (current account) as 
largely reflecting a conscious fixed-exchange-rate policy at underval-
ued rates undertaken by several of the major East Asian central banks. 
The purpose of this undervaluation on the part of the Asian countries 
is twofold: (1) build up reserves to guarantee that a repeat of the 1997 
Asian financial crisis will not occur, and (2) enable the countries to 
pursue an aggressive export-led growth-development strategy by being 
super-competitive in the large and growing U.S. domestic market. To 
prevent their currencies from appreciating, these countries, particu-
larly China, are buying up dollars and dollar-denominated assets, thus 
contributing to the U.S. current-account deficits.20
Recent patterns of international financial flows are consistent with 
this interpretation:21
1. U.S. financial markets have stayed strong even as the financing 
of the U.S. deficit shifts from private investors to foreign central 
banks (from 2000 to 2003, the official institutional share of 
investment inflows rose from 4 percent to 30 percent).
2. A large percentage of the $1.3 trillion in Asian governments’ 
foreign exchange reserves is in U.S. assets; central banks now 
claim about 12 percent of total foreign-owned assets in the 
United States, including more than $1 trillion in Treasury and 
agency securities.
3. Official inflows from Asia will likely continue for the foresee-
able future, keeping U.S. interest rates from rising too fast and 
choking off investment.
Bretton Woods I collapsed under the weight of imbalances consider-
ably smaller (as a share of GDP) than the ones today. How long can 
the Bretton Woods II system continue? In a series of recent papers,22 
Michael Dooley, David Folkerts-Landau, and Peter Garber maintain 
that Asian governments—pursuing a “mercantilist” development strat-
egy of undervalued exchange rates to support export-led growth—must 
continue to finance U.S. imports of their manufactured goods, since 
the United States is their largest market and a major source of inward 
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direct investment. After China completes the current phase of its 
development (perhaps in a decade or so) and goes to a flexible ex-
change rate, India will then provide the main backing for the dollar 
with a rupee/dollar link—the system can continue for at least several 
decades.
In short, the Bretton Woods II system implies that only a funda-
mental transformation in Asia’s growth strategy could undermine 
this mutually advantageous interdependence—an unlikely prospect, 
at least until China absorbs the 300 million low-skill workers from 
the interior provinces expected to move into its industrial and service 
sectors over the next generation.23
In a similar vein, Ronald McKinnon <<and Gunther Schnabl?>> 
of Stanford argue that Asian governments will continue to prevent 
their currencies from depreciating too much in order to maintain 
competitiveness, avoid imposing capital losses on domestic holders 
of dollar assets, and reduce the risk of an economic slowdown that 
could lead to a deflationary spiral.24 According to both theories, there 
should be no breakdown of the current dollar-based regime.25
Another variant of this model has been developed by Stephen Jen 
of Morgan Stanley.26 Jen believes that the dollar has been particularly 
stable because the world system is forming a large de facto dollar 
zone—an area where countries settle their international transactions 
and payments using the dollar. Currently the de facto dollar zone 
includes China, Japan, and many of the East Asian countries, as 
well as the oil-exporting members of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC)—in essence the two main blocs of balance-of-payments surplus 
countries.
The dollar-zone interpretation of today’s international financial 
system is much less restrictive than Bretton Woods II. While Bretton 
Woods II requires exchange rate fixity and undervaluation of the 
Asian currencies pegged to the dollar, all that is needed for a big bloc 
of countries to rely on the dollar for international transactions is that 
their own currencies are not fully convertible. Currency fixity or un-
dervaluation is not necessary for a country to qualify as a member of 
the de facto dollar zone. The important point is that even if counties 
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like China abandoned the Bretton Woods II system, they would most 
likely stay in the de facto dollar zone until they could carry out the 
reforms necessary to support their own convertible currencies—again 
a process that may take years. It follows logically that the bulk of in-
ternational trade will continue to be settled in U.S. dollars, especially 
trade between and with the Asian countries.
<<A head here?>>
In the face of such strong forces acting to maintain the strength of 
the U.S. dollar despite growing current account deficits, is there any 
way that the Iranian bourse could set off a decline in the value of the 
dollar, or reinforce a decline caused by other factors that might gain 
momentum and cause a shift away from dollars toward euros and 
eventually more oil transactions in euro-denominated prices? It is 
hard to conceive that the Iranian bourse, given its likely slow start-up 
and limited volume, would be capable by itself of affecting the value 
of the dollar. As for its ability to reinforce a growing retreat from the 
dollar, the number of credible scenarios relying mainly on economic 
factors appears limited—the most likely being the oil countries, es-
pecially if those in the Gulf in search of better yields begin spending 
their oil receipts on euro assets.
The sharp rise in oil prices over the past three years (from around 
$30 a barrel in 2003 to over $70 throughout most of 2006) has sig-
nificantly altered the ownership composition of the excess savings 
outside the United States.27 This will alter the dynamics of the currency 
markets in important ways:28
1. In 2005, the United States current-account deficit reached 
US$760 billion.
2. By 2006, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
OPEC’s current account surplus could reach US$337 billion, 
compared to Asia’s current account surplus of US$362 billion. 
<<update?>>
To date there is little direct, tangible evidence pointing at a mass 
exodus of investment from the United States or U.S. denominated 
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assets. The favored outlet for Arab investors, especially institutions 
like central banks and government agencies, still remains the U.S. 
bond/stock markets (the world’s largest), though London, Paris, and 
Frankfurt have also been competing for abundant Gulf savings in 
recent years. True, some private investors after 9/11 have divested 
from the United States for political reasons and because of regulatory 
requirements of the USA Patriot Act.29 Nevertheless:
It is a media myth that there has been a wholesale repatriation of Arab 
money from the US. GCC currency regimes are pegged to the dollar, 
GCC central bank reserves are overwhelmingly invested in the dollar, 
oil prices are invoiced and settled in dollars, the vast majority of the 
trillion dollar private and sovereign GCC wealth hoard is invested in 
dollar denominated securities and real estate. The smart money in the 
Gulf knows that investment logic, not politics or emotions, underwrites 
its historic overweight in American shares, bonds and properties. Sure, 
at the margin, perceived “expropriation risk” triggered private Saudi 
withdrawals from the US, but their funds were invested in Geneva, 
London, and Hong Kong offshore dollar assets.30
The reasons for the continued attractiveness of the United States as 
an investment destination for oil surplus can be traced to economic 
fundamentals: Overall the U.S. economy has proven resilient, flexible, 
and competitive compared with that of other industrial nations. This 
explains higher portfolio inflows and hence the steady demand for 
dollars. The IMF notes: “They [capital inflows into the United States] 
are unlikely to change direction abruptly since no other country or 
region enjoys the combination of robust growth and deep financial 
markets that the U.S. offers.”31 The dollar has also benefited from 
superior yield spreads relative to Japan and the eurozone in the past 
two years.32
The euro’s appreciation up to early 2005 and China’s revaluation of 
the renminbi (RMB) in mid-2005 have triggered a debate in the Gulf 
over the utility of exclusive dollar pegs, especially as a considerable 
share of GCC imports are from the euro area. However, the debate 
has remained largely academic, and a change of pegs—potentially 
combined with trading a share of oil in euros—does not appear im-
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minent. Gulf governments are likely to keep current regimes until 
the planned currency union in 2010. Given greater stability in dol-
lar assets, these will remain attractive, especially for cautious public 
investors. Nevertheless, a certain amount of diversification seems to 
be taking place.33
The fundamental shift in the ownership composition of excess sav-
ings in the world will not necessarily be negative for the dollar since 
for economic reasons OPEC countries in general should be as dollar-
centric as Asian countries. But the way petrodollars are invested may 
make them more “footloose” than Asian official reserves.34 Certainly 
large private-capital outflows are much more of a factor35 than the 
case with China and its capital controls. Private Gulf funds and these 
funds are more likely to flow into higher-risk non-U.S.-denominated 
assets.36 These flows may have been reinforced with the crash of Gulf 
stock markets in early 2006.37
These factors place a greater burden on the United States to main-
tain competitive interest rates and policy credibility and to convey a 
sense of prudence in order to retain these investments. It goes without 
saying that the United States must stem the increasing perception 
that it is anti-Arab or that its xenophobia will trump economics at 
critical junctures.
Assessment
Despite repeated reports over the several years that the planned bourse 
would finally open for business on March 20, 2006, and go head-to-
head with the New York Mercantile Exchange and the ICE Futures 
Exchange in London, the start date has been postponed to possibly 
some time in 2007.38 Interestingly, the Iranian bourse was conceived 
at a time of a strengthening euro and a weakening dollar. It was also 
a time when many observers were attaching dire implications to the 
rising U.S. current-account deficits and a federal budget that seemed 
out of control.
In short, all signs were pointing to increasing stress on the dol-
lar. In essence, this was the type of environment where perhaps one 
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more shock—a housing bubble or other financial malfunction—might 
push the dollar into a highly vulnerable range. In this environment 
the existence of a euro-denominated oil bourse might facilitate mass 
defections from and the rapid demise of the dollar—the straw that 
would break the dollar’s back. However, it was a time before the exis-
tence and implications of Bretton Woods II were clearly understood. 
It was also a period when most observers felt exchange rates were 
more affected by current-account imbalances than by real interest-
rate differentials.
Today, things look very different; the dollar has been strengthening 
at times and remaining relatively stable at others. While the current 
account keeps on growing, U.S. real interest rates are very attractive 
and the euro is plagued with uncertainty over lagging growth and 
productivity rates, uncertainty over the constitution, and possible 
defections (Italy).39 The Chinese are adamant that they will maintain 
their de facto link to the dollar—they are officially linked to a basket 
of currencies with the dollar presumably accounting for a large share 
of the dollar. Petrodollars are flowing into the United States to take 
advantage of that country’s broader and deeper capital markets.
In fact, all signs suggest that the de facto dollar zone is likely to 
persist for some time. Even as early as 1997, the writing seems to have 
been on the wall:
Incumbency is a strong advantage in the competition for reserve cur-
rency status. Both historical and econometric evidence point in this 
direction. The dollar being the reigning champion, it accounts for a 
larger share of global foreign exchange reserves than suggested by a 
simple comparison of U.S. and EU GDPs, and it should do so for some 
time to come. A more institutionally-oriented analysis reinforces the 
point. Reserve currencies are those which are issued by the governments 
of countries that are international financial centers. The United Sates 
gained its status as a financial center and the dollar its reserve-currency 
role only once the country acquired a central bank ready and willing 
to engage in day-to-day liquidity management and prepared to mount 
lender of last resort operations. The Maastricht Treaty does not foresee 
the European Central Bank as assuming comparable responsibilities. 
This will tend to slow the development of the euro zone as an inter-
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national financial center and, by implication, limit the euro’s reserve 
currency role.40
Far from being a threat to dollar-based oil pricing, and ultimately 
causing the demise of the dollar, the Iranian oil bourse is seen, at least 
by economists, more as a curiosity—a monument to uninformed, 
wishful thinking.41 “To steal a phase from that inspired Middle Eastern 
thinker Fouad Ajami, the Iranian oil bourse would seem then to fit 
best with the many other Middle Eastern “dream places.”42
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